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Sparks v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 12,  
100 P.3d 486 (April 28, 2005)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – FAILURE TO APPEAR CLAUSES 
 
Summary 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that “Failure to Appear” clauses are not unconscionable 
in plea agreements and upheld one in this case.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment of conviction. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Jason Robert Sparks was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance 
and intent to sell and transport a controlled substance.  Sparks entered into a plea bargain with 
the State.  The plea bargain contained the following Failure to Appear (“FTA”) clause:  “I 
understand that if I fail to appear for the scheduled sentencing date or I commit a new criminal 
offense prior to sentencing the State of Nevada would regain the full right to argue for any lawful 
sentence.”  Thereafter, Sparks failed to appear for his sentencing hearing and was later arrested 
on additional criminal charges.  The State asserted its right under the FTA clause and argued for 
consecutive prison terms.  Sparks filed this timely appeal.   
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court began its discussion of the issues by referencing the high standard imposed on 
the State for plea agreements: “[the State] is held to ‘the most meticulous standards of both 
promise and performance’ with respect to both the terms and the spirit of the plea bargain.”2  
Sparks clearly acknowledges that the FTA clause is applicable in this case, however, he argues 
that the FTA clause is unenforceable because it is contrary to Nevada law.  The Court disagrees.   
  
Sparks first argues that FTA clauses do not follow the written statutory form for plea 
agreements set forth in NRS 174.063.  The Court refuted this argument by noting that under the 
plain language of the statute, a plea agreement must only “substantially” comply with the 
statutory form.  Thus, the Court opined, the legislature allowed for modifications by merely 
requiring “substantial” compliance with the form.   
  
The Court then delved into the legislative history of the statute, even though by the 
Court’s own admission it is unnecessary to review legislative history when the language of the 
statute is unambiguous, as it is in this case.  The legislative history reveals that the legislature 
                                                 
1 Summarized by Bryce Loveland. 
2 Van Buskirk v. State, 102 Nev. 241, 243, 720 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1986). 
  
intended to allow flexibility in plea bargains to “retain some discretion as to the form of the 
written agreement, to facilitate the various 'fact patterns' that arise in criminal law.”3   
  
The Court similarly rejected Sparks’ argument that the FTA clause is void under Nevada 
case law because it contravenes this court's holdings in Gamble v. State4 and Villalpando v. 
State.5  The Court explained that neither case is applicable here because neither case involved a 
plea agreement containing an FTA clause or other similar clause.  The Court explained that 
there were cases, however, that supported its holding in this case.  The Court noted that in Citti 
v. State it had implicitly approved of a plea agreement containing an explicit reservation of a 
conditional right to argue by the State.6  Similarly, in other cases, the Court has recognized that 
a defendant is entitled to enter into a plea agreement affecting fundamental rights.7 
 The Court also rejected Sparks’ next argument, that the FTA clause is unconscionable 
because he was not aware of it.  Sparks signed the plea containing the FTA clause and also 
acknowledged that he had read it.  Additionally, the proper time for Sparks to object to the FTA 
clause was before he signed the plea.   
 The Court also rejected Sparks’ argument that the FTA clause is unconscionable because 
it gives the State the unilateral right to withdraw from the plea.  The Court explained that it is 
the criminal defendant who actually controls whether the State will be allowed to argue for a 
particular sentence.  Further, the FTA clause is reasonable because it relies on the criminal 
defendant’s ability to follow the law and show up for his sentencing hearing, which if he cannot 
do, should not be rewarded with a lesser sentence from a plea bargain.   
Conclusion  
 The Court held that the FTA clause in Sparks’ plea agreement was lawful and 
enforceable. Because Sparks violated the terms of the clause, the Court held that the State 
properly argued for consecutive sentences and the State did not breach the plea agreement.    
 
                                                 
3 Hearing on S.B. 549 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 68th Leg. (Nev., June 9, 1995) (summarizing statement 
of Clark County Chief Deputy District Attorney Ben Graham). 
4 95 Nev. 904, 604 P.2d 335 (1979). 
5 107 Nev. 465, 814 P.2d 78 (1991). 
6 107 Nev. 89, 92, 807 P.2d 724, 726 (1991). 
7 See Krauss v. State, 116 Nev. 307, 310, 998 P.2d 163, 165 (2000). 
